a directory is no mailbox unless it contains a cur/ subdir.
but if that one is present, create new/ and tmp/ if they are missing.
this makes it possible to resume interrupted maildir creations.
don't try to lock it until we actually read or write it.
the idea is to not fail with SyncState * if we tried to load the state
before selecting a non-existing mailbox. this is ok, because if the
mailbox is missing, we obviously have no sync state pertaining to it,
either.
as a side effect, this allows simplifying an error path.
when LITERAL+ is used, the server has no chance for early rejection of
messages. this means that the client can upload megabytes for nothing.
so simply don't use LITERAL+ for big messages. of course this adds
server roundtrips, but that's tough luck.
the limit could be arguably higher than 100k (or even configurable).
i set it to ~2 sec with my fairly average DSL line.
the primary objective is reducing the number of small SSL packets (which
are always padded), but fewer syscalls in the non-SSL case should be
good as well.
instead of keeping the structures in an opaque array (which was a shadow
of the struct pollfd array if poll() was supported), make them directly
addressable.
this has the advantage that notifier-altering operations (mostly
en-/disabling) don't need to look up the structure by file handle each
time.
on the downside, data locality in the main loop is worse.
neither of these have any real effect on performance.
note that the structures are not allocated separately, but embedded into
the the parent structure (like sockets already were).
the seznam.cz IMAP server seems very eager to send UIDNEXT responses
despite not supporting UIDPLUS. this doesn't appear to be a particularly
sensible combination, but it's valid nonetheless.
however, that means that we need to save the UIDNEXT value before we
start storing messages, lest imap_find_new_msgs() will simply overlook
them. we do that outside the driver, in an already present field - this
actually makes the main path more consistent with the journal recovery
path.
analysis by Tomas Tintera <trosos@seznam.cz>.
REFMAIL: 20141220215032.GA10115@kyvadlo.trosos.seznam.cz
we can't leave the store FRESH, as otherwise the error handling code
will assume it is still being opened and will return to the main loop.
depending on the config this would cause an immediate termination or an
indefinite wait.
this re-introduces 6741bc94 (just a bit differently), thus effectively
reverting fbfcfea5. i suppose this extra CRLF is needed by a broken
CRAM-MD5 implementation of some server, which is why it was there in the
original implementation as well. however, it breaks more pedantic
non-broken servers. if somebody complains, we'll need to add a much
more sophisticated hack.
we should make no assumptions about the layout of OpenSSL's certificate
store, in particular when they are wrong. so copy the interesting part
instead of "deep-linking" into it.
this code is uglier than it should be, but OpenSSL's extensive use of
macros to manage data types would force us to include the ssl headers
into our headers otherwise, which would be even uglier.
REFMAIL: <545442CC.9020400@nodivisions.com>
... for windows fs compatibility.
the maildir-specific InfoDelimiter inherits the global FieldDelimiter
(which affects SyncState), based on the assumption that if the sync
state is on a windows FS, the mailboxes certainly will be as well, while
the inverse is not necessarily true (when running on unix, anyway).
REFMAIL: <CA+m_8J1ynqAjHRJagvKt9sb31yz047Q7NH-ODRmHOKyfru8vtA@mail.gmail.com>
patch initially by Jack Stone <jwjstone@fastmail.fm>,
cleaned up by Jan Synacek <jsynacek@redhat.com>,
... and then almost completely rewritten by me. ^^
RequireCRAM (another fairly stupid "use if available" option) is now
deprecated. instead, the AuthMech option can be used to give a precise
list of acceptable authentication mechanisms (which is currently "a bit"
short). in particular, this allows *not* using CRAM-MD5 even if it's
available.
instead of using a callback which messes with the certificate chain
verification, simply let OpenSSL ignore errors during that phase and
check the result only afterwards.
the combinations of the various options made quite a mess. additionally,
'RequireSSL no' is inherently insecure - "use SSL if available" is plain
stupid.
the old options are still accepted, but will elicit a warning.
it doesn't belong there - it's a property of imap_server_conf_t.
the port setup is now done while reading the config.
this makes socket.[hc] imap-agnostic.
Oswald Buddenhagen